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Abstract 
Human development, in combination with technology, yields economic growth which, in 
turn, is necessary to generate further advances in human development.  This paper 
focuses on the first channel above and finds the relationship significant.  Secondly, the 
paper tries to investigate what affects technology change, as represented by TFP.  We 
examine the influence of openness, FDI, patents and R&D in a 22 country sample and 
also contrast Asian and Latin American experience. 
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I. Introduction 
  There can be little doubt that technology – both in its process and quality 
dimensions –  when combined with human development –  makes a critically important 
contribution to economic growth which in turn leads to advances in human development 
as a society’s bottom line achievement.  In a 1997 STICERD article “Development 
Thinking at the Beginning of the 21
st Century” Amartya Sen endeavored to distinguish 
between human progress by dint of BLAST, i.e., “achieved in Blood, Sweat and Tears,” 
also known as savings and investment, and GALA, human advancement via the 
enhancement of capabilities generated by a combination of human development and 
technology (Sen, 1997).  
  BLAST itself has, of course, become less tearful over time as the Harrod-Domar 
world of constant proportions yielded to Solow’s substitutability among inputs and the 
newly recognized sizable unexplained technology residual responsible for GDP growth. 
This exogenous technology change was indeed for some time seen as a “measure of 
our ignorance” and the holy grail to be incorporated into ever more sophisticated 
macroeconomic growth models.  More recently, the advent of the “new growth theory” of 
Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) et al. meant that technology change has been 
endogenized and linked up more closely to education, health and other such inputs, i.e., 
approaching human development.  But the objective remains GDP growth, which, in 
turn, leads to the bottom line, i.e. further improvements in human development.    
  What I intend to accomplish in this paper is, in the first instance, focus on the role 
of technology, in combination with human development, in generating the growth 
needed for further increases in human development.  This relationship between  
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technology and human development is an intensive one, running through growth as a 
critical instrument and to human development as the bottom line output.  There are 
really two channels to be considered here.  The first runs from economic growth to 
human development and is fueled by household and government expenditures, heavily 
influenced by the role of technology in converting household and government 
allocations of savings into advances in education, health and other dimensions of 
human development.  This production function contains a role for technology in 
converting BLAST inputs into GALA outputs but it is not yet terribly well understood.  A 
good deal of research has, of course, been done on the subject tracing the impact of 
single investments such as education expenditures coming out of economic growth by 
the state and the family on literacy or completed primary schooling.  But the joint impact 
of interactions among education, health and nutrition inputs, etc., in generating human 
development advances is still far from fully understood.  It has thus far proved difficult to 
determine exactly how technology change affects human development.  We know that 
per capita income affects life expectancy levels and nutrition, etc., and that human 
development is positively affected by household and government expenditures on 
health and education.  However, as much research, including that of Behrman (1990), 
has pointed out, there are many interrelated inputs, including home-schooling, home 
health inputs, the distribution of income as well as the relevance of household 
characteristics, plus alternative ways in which the public sector is organized, all of which 
makes it difficult to get a good fix on this production function. It reminds one of the 
problem encountered in earlier years, in determining agricultural sector productivity 
change, given multiple quantitative and qualitative inputs and the somewhat mysterious  
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role of technology in converting expenditures on agricultural inputs into agricultural 
productivity achievements. 
  The second channel runs from human development back to economic growth, 
once again with technology playing an important role.  In this paper I intend to focus on 
this second channel focusing on the impact of human development and technology on 
economic growth.  Secondly, I intend to explore how technology measured by the TFP 
can itself be better explained.  In the first instance, in other words, I want to show the 
importance of human development combining with technology in generating growth as 
an instrument for further improvements in human development.  In the second instance, 
I want to delve more closely into what generates technology as represented by the TFP.  
 
II.  Human Development, Technology and Economic Growth 
  In comparison to the literature on the relationship between growth and human 
development, the literature on what generates economic growth is vast.  Historically, 
much of it follows the neo-classical growth model of Solow (1956), followed by Barro 
and  Sala-i-Martin (2004), Romer (1990), Lucas (1988) etc., as incorporated in the more 
recent endogenous growth literature.  Much of this latter effort examines the role of 
education as well as of R&D and ideas as a source of growth, analyzing stocks of 
human capital that would put off diminishing returns and allow countries to grow at 
sustained rates indefinitely.  As Lucas (1988), for example, points out, since education 
is smoothly substitutable for other inputs, investments in education are a critical “input“ 
into growth.  Indeed, the new growth theory literature already contains elements of 
human development as an input into generating growth, even if not necessarily defined 
in those terms.  Technology is not explicitly incorporated, even as both neo-classical  
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and new growth theorists agree that total factor productivity TFP represents the best 
measure of technology change and exercises a dominant influence on a country’s 
growth performance.  It is similarly understood that the HDI, especially if we focus on 
HDI*, i.e., the HDI minus its income component, represents a good summary of the 
most important inputs into this particular production function.  Thus, our first task is to 
understand the relationship between HDI* and TFP as they jointly affect economic 
growth.   
  Table 1 presents GDP as the dependent variable and TFP as well as HDI*, along 
with more conventional inputs like labor and capital, as the right-side independent 
variables.  In all columns the dependent variable is the log of countries’ annual GDP 
growth measured in $2,000 US dollars.  In all cases we have controlled for country fixed 
effects and included the countries’ total labor force, the log of countries’ total capital 
stock, and countries’ TFP value as independent variables.  Regressions one to three 
also include HDI*, i.e., the non-income human development index based on UNDP’s 
Human Development Reports, including one-year and two-year lags, as independent 
variables.  In all our regressions our results show that the coefficients of the TFP and 
the HDI* are also significantly positive indicating that technology and human 
development both positively contribute to economic growth.  At the same time the fact 
that the coefficients on the one-year lag and the two-year lag of HDI* are significantly 
positive shows us that high levels of human development in previous periods are also 
positively associated with contemporary GDP growth. This implies that the positive 
correlation between human development and GDP is not due to reverse causality but 
that high levels of human development and of technology change both significantly 
improve economic performance.  In regressions four, five and six we replace HDI* with  
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education and lagged education, obtaining highly significant results indicating that the 
education component of HDI is undoubtedly the more important contributor within HDI*. 
 
III.  Impacts on the TFP 
  Let me now turn to our second task and examine what goes into the TFP variable 
itself.   In spite of what we know to be its weaknesses, i.e., the residual includes 
economies of scale, terms of trade effects, etc. in addition to pure technology change, 
the TFP is generally accepted as the best yardstick of a country’s innovative capacity.  
Ideally, we would like to know what determines that capacity, e.g. whether openness as 
modeled by exports and/or tariffs, FDI, R&D, and various types of patents play 
significant roles.   We will desist from pursuing other suggestions found in the literature, 
including the influence of geography, institutions, the extent of democracy, among 
others. 
  It is generally assumed that a country’s openness to trade positively influences 
technology change.  Keller (2004), among others, emphasized that technology change 
is determined in large part by technology diffusion carried in traded goods as well as by 
FDI across borders.  Imported R&D, especially if adapted to domestic conditions, is 
usually assumed to substantially raise domestic TFP, while trade with countries closer 
to the international technology frontier might be especially beneficial to developing 
countries, avoiding the need to invest a great deal of time and resources into the 
development of such technologies on their own.  The key, of course, is the extent to 
which such frontier technologies are modified and adapted to local conditions.  This 
concern includes the product as well as the process dimension of technology change, 
i.e., adaptiveness to domestic consumer tastes and needs, a subject frequently the  
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main focus of innovative entrepreneurs, while process adaptation is concentrated on by 
most academic economists.  The adaptation of international technology to new 
processes or products can be very important in decreasing capital intensity, making 
more efficient use of unskilled labor and offering consumers products more closely 
aligned with their preferences, all of which enhances TFP.  While the factor proportions 
used to produce a given quality product differ substantially between the typical 
developed and developing country, this difference is typically smaller than the gap in the 
actual endowments.   
  Table 2 presents our OLS regressions examining the contribution of various 
leading suspects for the enhancement of 22 developing countries’ TFP.  In all 
regressions the dependent variable is countries’ TFP value relative to the U.S., based 
on the estimates of UNIDO.  Regression 1 includes exports over GDP as an indicator of 
openness to trade, net inflows of FDI over GDP, as well as both international and 
domestic patent applications.  Regression 2 substitutes the lag of FDI inflows for current 
values.  In both regressions the coefficients on exports are significantly positive, 
confirming that openness to trade is conducive to technology development.  
Interestingly, domestic patent applications clearly matter positively while international 
patents applications impact TFP negatively.   This may be due to the frequently referred 
to possibility that foreign patents are used less to transfer technology and more to 
prevent entry, enforce market shares, restrict exports to third countries and the like.  
Turning to regression 3, we add another measure of openness to trade, a country’s 
average applied tariff rate on all products, as well as another indicator of internal 
technology activity, a country’s official R&D expenditure as a percentage of its GDP.  
(Since the data for these added independent variables are only available starting from  
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the 1990’s, regression 3 contains a much smaller sample of countries.)   The  
coefficients on both provide significant support for our hypothesis.  Regression 4 again 
simply replaces net inflows of FDI in regression 3 with its lag, while regression 5 
removes the percentage of GDP in exports as well as both types of patent applications 
so that the tariff rate becomes the sole indicator of openness to trade, and domestic 
R&D the sole indicator of domestic technological activity.  The consistently negative and 
significant coefficient on tariff rates in regressions 3 to 6 provide additional support for 
the importance of openness to trade while the consistently positive and significant 
coefficients on R&D expenditures support the hypothesis of  the importance of  the 
official expenditures of this type in generating advances in TFP.  
  We should recognize, of course, that an individual entrepreneur and his capacity 
to make full use of technical knowledge from abroad is at best uncertain since 
technology is often tacit and the problems of communicating it and organizing it 
effectively, especially given long distances, institutional and cultural as well as 
geographic, render the implementation of such adaptation difficult. Since technology 
elements are only partially tradeable complementary institutional investments are 
required.  It is for this reason that domestic patents, unlike international patents, as we 
see from our regression results (see Table 2), are likely to be especially helpful in 
converting tacit into explicit technical knowledge and TFP. 
  One of the impediments to openness is the resort to import restrictions both of 
the tariff variety and other under-the-radar mercantilist measures, including anti-
dumping legislation, “buy domestic” legislation and the like.  We, therefore, included 
tariffs in our regressions, along with export performance.  Positive spillovers from 
foreign trade are likely to be more pronounced if they are accompanied by domestic  
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adaptation.  For example, a substantial increase in TFP in Japan in the late 19
th century 
took place as a result of the utilization of imported technology, the loom, in cotton 
spinning to replace an old one, the mule.  In contrast to the Indian industry, the 
Japanese witnessed a virtually instantaneous switch from mules to looms which in turn 
prompted major adaptations in ancillary processes such as higher speeds of machinery 
in use, the introduction of cotton mixing and the employment of more women to repair 
the broken threads.  Otsuka and coauthors (1998) attribute the overall decline in the 
capital/labor ratio in Japan around the turn of the century to this switch to the loom and 
the subsequent labor-using adaptation processes.  In contrast, India continued to import 
new mules during the last part of the 19
th century and, for cultural reasons, failed to 
include women in the labor force, nor did they deploy cotton-mixing.  As a consequence 
Japanese companies in China took away the Chinese markets from their India 
competitors.   
  FDI can carry technology but may also serve as a two-edged sword, i.e., 
multinational companies can stimulate technological change through labor training and 
the provision of high-quality inputs and trade connections but much depends on timing, 
i.e., the multinational corporation usually begins as a wholly owned subsidiary, becomes 
a joint venture and finally gives way to licensing or management contracts as the 
recipient country matures. In an idealized world, a disinvestment-transformation 
arrangement should be agreed upon ex ante in order to make the eventual transition 
easier.  The independence of the multinational corporation, in particular during the 
customary early import substitution subphase, should be viewed as transitional if the 
relationship is not to sour, as, over time, it becomes less advantageous to the LDC and 
more advantageous to the FDI company.    
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  Inventive activity as summarized by patents clearly impacts TFP.  As the 2001 
Human Development Report noted, intellectual property rights are intimately intertwined 
with technology change because they make it possible for individual innovators to reap 
an eventual return on their investment.  Foreign patents may lead to domestic patenting 
and an outburst of utility model patenting as we saw in the Japanese historical case 
(Otsuka et al.). Where utility models exist, they are especially helpful to medium and 
small-scale firms, and appear to have a high correlation with TFP.  
  Foreign patents, on the other hand, may restrict other technology entry, protect 
markets against local enterprise, restrict exports, and thus present a threat to the 
development of local industry. We therefore, distinguished between foreign and 
domestic patents and our econometric results fully support this decision. The 2001 
Human Development Report noted that while TRIPS may benefit emerging developing 
countries such as Brazil, which are likely to profit from increased local innovation 
resulting from intellectual property rights legislation, LDCs which still lack formal 
innovation structures and institutions have faced higher costs without counterbalancing 
benefits.  Thus, the impact of domestic patents on developing countries depends very 
much on the stage of development and it is no accident that the more entrepreneurial 
and successful developing countries of East Asia were intellectual property pirates for 
some time until they themselves became concerned about their own intellectual 
property rights being infringed upon by the next wave of emerging economies.  Given 
the proper adaptation, developing countries can reap the benefit of investments and 
patents by rich countries in the invention process without having to incur relatively large 
costs, all of which has to do with the utilization of domestic patents and domestic R&D.    
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  Since most R&D takes place in developed countries the technology that results 
from these expenditures naturally yield North-biased technologies.  Entrepreneurs in 
developing countries must be able to make effective use of such imported technologies.  
The educational system requires scientific vocational and technical literacy and not the 
simple copying of the educational system of the North.  The aim must be to improve the 
skill level of the average LDC worker, including vocational education instead of 
academic education at the secondary level to encourage the appropriate adaptation of 
imported technologies and thus the strengthening of TFP.  Science-based R&D is 
defined as technology which arises from a change in our basic understanding of the 
laws governing the environment while empirically-based R&D is based on trial and 
error.  Tinkering or so-called blue collar R&D in metal working, brick making, beer 
brewing, for example, made for TFP progress in Japan which did not need to rely on 
basic scientific advances. Historically, the US endowment favored empirically-based 
technology change while the German endowment, deficient in natural resources, shifted 
towards the engineering and chemical industries.  As Kuznets (1966) has pointed out, 
using science wisely and selectively is related to the education system and to the types 
of interventions, direct or indirect, of government.   
As we have shown, countries with higher levels of expenditure on R&D 
experience higher rates of TFP since they are critical for the adaptive responses for 
international technologies we have discussed.  Only 5% of the world’s formal R&D is 
expended by developing countries and the typical LDC spends only .5% of its GDP on 
R&D, compared with 5% in developed countries.  The East Asian economies spend 
between 1.5% and 3.0% of their GDP on formal R&D while the Latin American countries 
fall below 1%.  The adequacy of domestic R&D in terms of generating TFP hinges on  
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fiscal incentives and institutional innovations as well as on education strategies.  Large 
firms in the position of relative monopoly may have less incentive to innovate and, 
therefore, are less interested in R&D. They are likely to prefer the stability of the status 
quo.  In the successful developing countries, in particular in East Asia, it is in small and 
medium scale firms in relatively more competitive industries that the most significant 
R&D activity took place.  Wang and Tsai (2003), examining 136 Taiwanese firms 
between 1994 and 2000, found R&D a significant determinant of TFP growth, i.e. every 
10% increase in R&D expenditures led to a 2% increase in the growth rate of TFP.   
Institutional innovations by the state, including the establishment of R&D institutes, have 
also been very helpful to smaller firms that cannot afford major organized R&D efforts.  
The Industrial Technology Research Institute, ITRI, in Taiwan, is a good example. The 
aforementioned utility model patent can be very helpful in this regard since much R&D 
may be carried out in the form of tinkering or blue collar activities on factory floors and 
repair shops, including the famous “reverse engineering,” not all of which is associated 
with piracy but none of which is captured in official R&D statistics. An LDC may reap a 
higher payoff for its TFP from an imported machine if it was reverse engineered and 
redesigned by workers on the factory floor to suit the special needs of the local 
environment.   
  The emphasis here is clearly on adaptive rather than on basic R&D.  Most people 
agree that the greatest waste of all is second-rate scientific or basic research.  It is not 
claimed that one can neglect basic science-focused R&D entirely, particularly in such 
areas as agriculture and health.  Without such research, the Green Revolution 
technology in agriculture would not have had the necessary sustaining power and the 
necessary defense against local pests and diseases.  Similarly, in the field of health,  
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few people would argue that a single transnational science can really be equally 
responsive to very different conditions around the world. This becomes relevant even in 
such activities as footwear production depending on cowhide tanning procedures which 
depend on the way cows are fed, or in tackling the textile industries’ different humidity 
requirements.  Minimal scientific literacy is necessary in some of these areas, even if it 
is ill-advised and expensive to attempt to show the flag in an array of frontier science 
endeavors.   
  We have made a number of comments contrasting Latin America and Asia.  In 
Tables 3A and 3B we have tried to examine empirically whether there indeed exists 
such cross-regional differences in the relative importance of various influences on TFP.  
In these tables we have replicated the regressions of Table 2 for sub-samples of East 
Asian and Latin American countries, respectively.  The coefficients on exports in 
regressions 1 and 2 and the coefficients on the tariff rate in regressions 3 to 6, are 
already much stronger and more significant in the case of the East Asian countries, 
supporting the notion that openness to trade plays a larger role in strengthening TFP in 
that region.  Equally interesting is the finding that the coefficients for  R&D in 
regressions 3 to 6 though equally significant, are bigger for the Latin American 
countries.  Finally, we find a startling contrast in the impact of the two different types of 
patents in the two regions.  While domestic patents continue to be significantly helpful to 
TFP in the East Asia case, with foreign patents significantly unhelpful, virtually the 
opposite holds for the Latin American countries, e.g. foreign patents are favored over 
the domestic type.  
  This  contrast in what strengthens TFP between Asia and Latin America, as  
indicated by our empirical results, is instructive.  In a typical Latin American country, say  
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Brazil, much better endowed with natural resources and a lower labor-land ratio, the 
existence of natural resource bonanzas can lead to the relative neglect of the trade and 
human development.   This is one manifestation of the natural resource curse and 
relates as well to the choice of education strategy.  For example, Latin America’s focus 
on the academic tract at the secondary level and a disproportionate emphasis on 
humanities-oriented tertiary education are in sharp contrast to East Asia’s concentration 
on vocational education at the secondary level and on science and technology at the 
tertiary level.  Latin America with its relatively strong unions applying pressure to delay 
trade liberalization, i.e., as measured by lower tariff reductions, felt secure in 
maintaining its import substitution policies longer, while East Asia was impelled by its 
lack of natural resources to shift early on to a more internationally competitive human 
resource-intensive growth path.  The consequence was a substantially larger role for 
TFP: 2.6% annually in Taiwan, compared to 1% in Brazil between 1966 and 1991 
(Young, 1995).  On the other hand, Latin America’s more inward-oriented policies 
induced more domestic R&D in partial compensation for the lower impact of 
international variables on TFP. 
 
IV. Summary  and  Conclusions 
  The relationship between growth and human development is an iterative one.  
One production function runs from growth to human development, the other from human 
development to growth.  In this paper our first objective was to examine the second 
strand, i.e. to establish that human development, lagged or non-lagged, in contribution 
with technology, measured by TFP, yields increases in the current rate of growth.  We  
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were also able to conclude that the education component of the HDI* (HDI minus the 
income component) makes an especially important contribution to economic growth. 
  We then turned to an examination of the independent factors determining the 
strength of TFP. We found that open markets, whether measured by exports or by low 
tariff rates enhance TFP. The same is true of FDI which enhances the ability to adapt 
imported technology to local environments.  Interestingly, domestic patents are 
significantly helpful while international patents re not, indicating that the former may act 
to accommodate transferred technology while the latter is more likely to prevent entry, 
inhibit domestic technology, change as well as constrain exports to third countries.  In 
the same vein we found that countries’ R&D expenditures significantly enhance TFP by 
their ability to further the adaptation to imported technology as well as to convert tacit 
into explicit technical knowledge. 
  Finally, we applied the same regressions separately to the Latin American and 
East Asian countries in our sample.  Openness of the economy, as measured by export 
orientation and tariff rates makes a more pronounced and significant difference in the 
case of the East Asian countries as compared to Latin America.  We, moreover, found 
that R&D, though a significant contributor to TFP in both regions, plays a larger relative 
role in the more domestically oriented Latin American region.  This difference is 
accentuated even more by our finding that while domestic patents contribute positively 
and international patents negatively in East Asia the exact opposite holds for Latin 
America.  These results support the notion that natural resource rich countries are more 
likely to be inward-oriented while the resource poor East Asians relied more heavily on 
a human resource-intensive growth rate and achieved higher levels of TFP. 
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Table 1 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GDP  GDP  GDP GDP GDP GDP 
                    
labor 0.546*** 0.551*** 0.556*** 0.530*** 0.536***  0.542***
  (11.9)  (12.1)  (12.06) (12.98) (13.11) (13.18) 
capital 0.470*** 0.473*** 0.475*** 0.455*** 0.459***  0.464***
  (23.34) (23.65) (23.99) (24.03) (24.32) (24.69) 
TFP 1.647*** 1.645*** 1.644*** 1.647*** 1.643***  1.641***
  (15.19) (15.17) (15.14) (15.37) (15.31) (15.25) 
HDI*  0.451**       
  (2.114)       
HDI*t-1    0.402*      
    (1.924)      
HDI*t-2     0.358*     
     (1.738)     
education t      0.667***   
      (4.089)    
education t-1       0.606***   
       (3.738)   
education t-2        0.547***
        ( 3 . 3 8 3 )  
Constant 2.904*** 2.787*** 2.678*** 3.411*** 3.252***  3.097***
  (4.3)  (4.143) (3.984) (6.295) (6.017) (5.737) 
        
Observations  631 631 631 631 631 631 
R-squared 0.996  0.996  0.996 0.996 0.996 0.996 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 2 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Variables TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP 
                    
export 0.00223***  0.00219***
-
0.000945  -0.00112       
   (3.635)  (3.571)  (-0.590)  (-0.698)       
non-resident patent 
applications -2.16e-06* 
-2.29e-
06** 
-4.25e-
06*** 
-4.39e-
06***       
   (-1.841)  (-1.967)  (-3.072)  (-3.126)       
resident patent 
applications  1.12e-06* 1.18e-06** 1.71e-07  3.15e-07       
   (1.912)  (2.047)  (0.153)  (0.277)       
FDI (net inflow) t  0.00433     0.0162***     -0.000306    
   (1.139)     (2.699)     (-0.0682)    
tariff rate       
-
0.00521**
-
0.00551**  -0.00398** -0.00392** 
         (-2.427)  (-2.571)  (-2.067)  (-2.063) 
R&D expenditures        0.142***  0.138***  0.0685***  0.0692*** 
         (4.122)  (3.969)  (3.419)  (3.486) 
FDI (net inflow) t-1     0.00558     0.0158**     0.000741 
      (1.372)     (2.583)     (0.165) 
Constant 0.361***  0.359***  0.424***  0.438***  0.430***  0.426*** 
   (26.64)  (26.51)  (6.691)  (7.011)  (12.15)  (12.78) 
Observations 592  578  89  89  122 122 
R-squared 0.040  0.043  0.388 0.383  0.126  0.127 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 3A 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Variables  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP 
                    
export  0.00555***  0.00556*** 0.00161 0.00156       
   (10.89)  (10.91)  (1.587)  (1.612)       
non-resident 
patent applications  -2.63e-06*** 
-2.44e-
06*** 
-3.65e-
06*** 
-3.35e-
06***       
   (-2.895)  (-2.710)  (-5.555)  (-4.932)       
resident patent 
applications 2.23e-06*** 
2.23e-
06*** 
1.29e-
06**  1.12e-06*       
   (5.387)  (5.460)  (2.343)  (2.042)       
FDI (net inflow) t  -0.0188***    
-
0.00456    -0.0229***    
   (-3.463)     (-1.013)     (-3.823)    
tariff rate       
-
0.00163 -0.00156 -0.00260**  -0.00215* 
         (-1.410)  (-1.420)  (-2.263)  (-2.029) 
R&D expenditures        0.131*** 0.135***  0.133***  0.137*** 
         (7.857)  (8.279)  (10.98)  (12.31) 
FDI (net inflow) t-1     -0.0220***     -0.00751     -0.0259*** 
      (-3.972)     (-1.668)     (-4.769) 
Constant 0.178***  0.178***  0.220*** 0.220***  0.270***  0.261*** 
   (14.63)  (14.61)  (4.469)  (4.798)  (9.578)  (10.57) 
                    
Observations 210  207  33  33  33  33 
R-squared 0.540  0.547  0.951 0.954  0.853  0.876 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3B 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Variables  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP  TFP 
                    
export  0.00147*  0.00127  -0.00317  -0.00251       
   (1.851)  (1.612)  (-1.457)  (-1.181)       
non-resident 
patent 
applications 
6.68e-
06***  6.51e-06***  3.84e-06  3.49e-06       
   (2.855)  (2.833)  (1.199)  (1.131)       
resident patent 
applications  1.45e-05 1.37e-05 
-
0.000144***
-
0.000148***      
   (1.252)  (1.215)  (-5.146)  (-5.586)       
FDI (net inflow) t 
-
0.00935***     -0.00823     -0.00719*    
   (-2.750)     (-1.384)     (-1.741)    
tariff rate        0.00235  0.00190  0.00421  0.00463 
         (0.558)  (0.468)  (1.176)  (1.354) 
R&D 
expenditures        0.630***  0.663***  0.197***  0.206*** 
         (6.392)  (7.080)  (4.774)  (4.968) 
FDI (net inflow) t-1     -0.00791**     -0.0142**     -0.00844** 
      (-2.158)     (-2.313)     (-2.058) 
Constant 0.443***  0.442***  0.379***  0.380***  0.363***  0.358*** 
   (24.84)  (25.14)  (4.657)  (4.876)  (7.170)  (7.745) 
                    
Observations 347 337  50  50 83 83 
R-squared 0.089  0.086  0.556 0.588  0.298  0.308 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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